102 Minutes

“‘It’s a bomb, let’s get out of here.’ And he was sure he knew how it had gotten up there. Moments earlier, a messenger had arrived with a trolley of documents for Jim Connors in the real estate department. Surely that was how the bomb had been wheeled in, Gaeta thought; the boxes of ‘documents’ had been a Trojan horse.” 

This quote expresses the lack of factual information inside the World Trade Center towers on 9/11, as many workers inside, as well as emergency rescue workers, lacked clear information as to what happened and when. Here, Gerry Gaeta, a member of the team that oversaw trade center construction projects, has no idea a plane has smashed into the north tower. Gaeta thinks the plane crash is a bombthat makes it inside the building hidden in real estate documents for the soon-to-happen change in ownership from the Port Authority to private developer Larry Silverstein. 

“The bank’s assets, the memo said, were its people—more valuable than any reports that were being written, more important than tickets for trades that were outstanding, more vital than any project that would be disrupted. In an emergency, they were to drop their work and go.” 

Here, Dwyer and Flynn refer to the emergency procedure practiced by Mizuho Capital Markets, and its corporate affiliate, Fuji Bank, which had space on every floor between 78 and 93 in the south tower. The firm had apparently learned its lesson from the chaos of the 1993 Trade Center evacuation. Due to a lack of proper information from Trade Center safety officials, who tell employees the trouble is in the north tower, not the south tower, most of the Mizuho/Fuji employees return to their desks. This lack of correct information leads to the deaths of many of these employees and permeates the entire morning.

“‘Hi, what’s new?’ she said, when she heard her son’s voice. ‘Mom, I’m not calling to chat,’ Feeney said. ‘I’m in the World Trade Center and it’s been hit by a plane.’ ‘Please tell me you are below it,’ his mother said. ‘No, I’m above it,’ he said. ‘There are seventy of us in one room. They have closed the doors and they are trying to keep the smoke out.’” 

Garth Feeney was at the World Trade Center for the Risk Waters conference. He was eating breakfast at Windows on the World, a restaurant, when the first plane strikes the north tower. His phone call home is one example of many, with people trapped in the towers getting in touch with loved ones. Feeney calls home before 9 a.m., and before the tower collapses. No one inside Windows on the World after impact survives.

“And so the police helicopters lifted off without any firefighters, leaving Chief Pfeifer to wonder about the spread of fire on the upper floors 1,200 feet above him, even though, from 8:52 on, a police helicopter had a clear view of the damage. Indeed, a few minutes later, the pilot of Aviation 14 sent in a grim bird’s eye-report. ‘Be advised at this time,’ Detective Timothy Hayes said. ‘Be advised we do have people confirmed falling out of the building at this time. It looks like four sides are cut open. A lot of flames.’” 

Here, the authors show just how much confusion reigned on 9/11. Despite safety revisions drafted in response to the 1993 bombing that envisioned firefighters riding alongside police in the choppers, it never happened. As a result, the fire department was without essential information about the location of fires. This complicated rescue efforts, as firefighters had to search. In addition, if Chief Pfeifer had more and better information, his rescue plans might have been totally different. 

“For all the spears launched, however, the city did not organize a single joint drill involving all the emergency responders at the trade center in the eight years after the 1993 attack. The last joint drill appears to have been the one held in 1982, preparations for a plane crash that did not come for nineteen years. If the city’s Office of Emergency Management did not have the history or clout to forge an effective partnership between the Fire and Police Departments before September 11, some critics believed, it certainly had no opportunity that morning.” 

This quote highlights a central problem that led to a massive death toll on 9/11: interagency squabbles between the police and fire departments. The 1982 drill was one that involved multiple agencies and was held only because an Argentine airliner came within ninety seconds of hitting the north tower due to problems communicating with air traffic controllers. In subsequent years, the drill was never replicated. The chaos, confusion, lack of information and poor communication between agencies proved disastrous, as many firefighters died inside when the towers collapsed. 

“Like a black hole, the gaping, blazing wound in the north tower had a gravitational pull, absorbing the attention of pedestrians, rescuers, and camera crew for miles. That left the people in the south tower largely on their own.” 

Here, the authors continue to develop the theme of confusion so prevalent on the morning of September 11th. Due to lack of communication between rescue agencies, employees in the south tower did not know what to do and in the earliest, most important moments to escape that morning, those in the south tower lacked factual information. Had they better information, workers might have evacuated right away, instead of returning to work. Instead, depending on which Port Authority officer workers were reached, as those in the towers sought information, Trade Center employees received different answers as to whether to stay or evacuate. 

“A few seconds after the plane’s impact, Elaine Duch, a member of the Port Authority staff, wandered the 88th floor, dazed, charred, her clothes nearly burnt off her. She had been getting on the elevator when the fireball of fuel blew through the shaft, the flames shooting out of any opening to gulp oxygen. The ceilings had collapsed in the hallways. Out of their offices and cubicles, men and women were swarming. Where the elevators had been were now gaping holes. At least two of the three stairways were either in flames or filled with smoke. Who was in charge of salvaging them from this roaring hell?” 

This quote illustrates the utter horror those at and above the point of impact experience in the north tower. There are only three stairways because of a reduction in safety measures legalized by the 1968 changes to the city building code. Before then, high-rises were required to have twice thisamount of stairwells, plus fire shafts—stairways—that would have been free of smoke.

“It was hardly the job of Frank De Martini and Pablo Ortiz and the others from 88 to go around prying doors […] Only when people like De Martini and his crew took it upon themselves to attack those barriers—broken rubble, stuck doors, disorientation—could people go free. Above the 91st floor, the stairways were plugged solid, the collapsed drywall forming an impermeable membrane, a border line that could not be crossed, even for people on the 92nd and 93rd.” 

This quote illustrates the rescue efforts of trade center employees. It shows how, in the face of the lack of proper evacuation planning, those in the north tower were mostly on their own. The quote characterizes the heroism shown by some like De Martini, who never makes it out of the tower.

“Down on the 44th floor, before Michael Otten could spit out the first word of reproach to the man with the backpack who had delayed his elevator, the car shook in a death rattle, a mouse swinging in the jaws of a cat. The woman next to him was hurled to the ground. A blanket of dust dropped over everyone.” 

This is the moment United Airlines Flight 175 smashes into the south tower, one second shy of 9:03 a.m. Otten was growing annoyed at a man whose lack of awareness kept the elevator doors from closing. This quote captures the instant that annoyance transforms into chaos. Before this, people in the south tower had been informed to evacuate only if conditions warranted evacuation. 

“As it happened, the World Trade Center was planned at a moment of radical transformation in the construction of tall buildings, and its owner, the Port Authority, availed itself of those changes in spectacular fashion. The new approaches made it possible for the Port Authority to build higher and cheaper, with the twin towers the first skyscrapers to use virtually no masonry in their construction. The changes of this era also allowed the Port Authority to turn far more of the towers over to rentable space—as opposed to safety and service functions, like stairways and elevators […] Some of those changes also made escape impossible for people on the upper floors.” 

Here, the authors develop a major theme: increased profits and decreased safety measures, much akin to the Titanic. The 1968 city code allowed for reductions in safety precautions needed in high-rises, as real estate industry advocates argued the old code was based on outdated technology. These reductions prove costly in the realm of human lives on September 11th. 

“‘I believe the building probably could sustain multiple impacts of jetliners because this structure is like the mosquito netting on your screen door, this intense grid,’ De Martini said. ‘And the jet plane is just a pencil puncturing the screen netting. It really does nothing to the screen netting.’”

This is a quote given by Frank De Martini in a 2001 History Channel documentary that captures the feelings so many had about the trade centers, as so many believed the towers to be indestructible. 

“‘Okay,’ Savas said. ‘What do you need me to do?’ One of the other Port Authority workers shook his head. ‘We just got you out—you need to leave the building.’ No, Savas insisted. He wanted to help. ‘I’ve got a second wind.’” 

This quote illustrates the bravery shown by everyday trade center workers. Savas, a Port Authority employee, was trapped inside an elevator when his new boss, John Griffin, freed Savas. Knowing the danger of the situation, Savas nonetheless refuses to evacuate and goes on helping with the rescue efforts. 

“Atop a piece of glass that rested at its four corners on the shoulders of three Port Authority officers and the paramedic, with James Flores lending a hand to keep it in balance, Lauren Smith left the World Trade Center for the last time, traveling through the concourse that took her east, to Church Street, where ambulances were waiting. Back at the elevator, firefighters were struggling to open the doors of the elevator she had managed to slip from.” 

Lauren Smith is first trapped in the elevator; once those inside manage to pry open the doors, she falls down the elevator shaft.Upon landing, she breaks ribs and punctures a lung. To rescue her, Port Authority employees improvise, removing the glass top of a counter to serve as a stretcher for carrying Smith out. This quote illustrates difficulties firefighters faced attempting to free those trapped in the elevators, which include resistors that block doors from opening when an elevator car does not stop at the right place. Moments before this, Smith and others in the car were freefalling, until the elevator safety harness halted the descent, just before the ground floor.

“The mezzanine overlooked the lobby like a choir loft, running along the perimeter of the building. From the mezzanine, there were only two ways out. One set of doors opened in several places onto the plaza of the complex, the public square of the trade center where on sunny days people gathered for concerts and fresco lunches. Now, however, it was filled with flaming debris and bodies, which were continuing to drop from the upper floors of the buildings. One Port Authority police officer thought he saw thirteen people jump in just a matter of seconds.” 

This quote illustrates how quickly a normally banal environment is transformed by an act of terror. The horror witnessed here can be applied to malls, nightclubs, schools—anywhere a mass shooting or bomb attack takes place. Note the contrast between the churchlike imagery of a choir loft and the hellish imagery of flaming debris and people falling to their deaths.

“Most of the seventy-five stores had closed soon after the planes hit, giving the windowless concourse an eerie, tomblike quality as people sprinted through the corridors and sloshed through water that was ankle deep at points. Nonetheless, the mall served as a sanctuary, a tunnel that allowed people to flee, safe from the flaming debris and hurtling bodies that were pelting the plaza, just above their heads.” 

Here, the authors show how improvisation saves the lives of thousands. Because of debris and bodies falling into the space between the two towers, evacuees leave through the underground mall concourse. Ironically, it is the mall, that iconic symbol of American capitalism, that gets people safely away from an attack committed by those set against the consumer capitalism American society thrives upon. The quote also represents a moment of praise for trade center engineers, and one instant where lessons from the 1993 bombing were learned and applied. After that attack, a computer study showed people traveled too far to reach exits in the concourse. As a result, engineers demolished valuable rentable space, and in its place designed $34M in improvements to the concourse, which gave people a better chance of getting out during emergencies. 

“Ed McNally, the director of technology for Fiduciary, called his wife, Liz. He wanted to tell her some things. She and the children had meant the world to him. The papers for his insurance were in this file; other important documents could be found in another file. He had to go. He hung up, then called back a few minutes later. Liz’s fortieth birthday was coming up, and he had made plans to surprise her. ‘I feel silly,’ he said. ‘I booked a trip to Rome. Liz, you have to cancel that.’ His wife tried to shake that entire line of thinking. ‘Ed,’ Liz said, ‘you’re getting out of there. The firemen are coming up to get you. You are a problem solver. You’re going to get out of there.’” 

This quote is one example of the final phone calls made home from those trapped above the impact zone in the south tower. Note the sense of inevitability McNally expresses, coupled with the lack of panic. The quote also represents a turning point, as up until this point, many trapped on the upper floors believed they would be saved.

“‘Why don’t you go?’ the fireman asked. ‘No, I’m staying with my friend,’ he replied. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people fleeing the north tower had seen the pair as they walked past them on their way to the lobby and safety. Keith Meerholz took a long look at Beyea and Zelmanowitz when the line of evacuees passed as he approached the 27th-floor landing […] He could see that the fellow in the wheelchair was younger than the man who stood with him. Maybe, Meerholz thought, he would help carry the paralyzed man down, get some help from one of the other young men in the stairway.” 

This is a tragic but important quote as it illustrates the type of camaraderie developed by those who worked together each day in the trade center. As Meerholz, scorched by flames that spit from an elevator door, passes the paralyzed Beyea, Meerholz seems to understand the strength of friendship between the two men. This quote also shows the belief Beyea and the much older Zelmanowitz must have still had in the idea that firefighters were coming to rescue them, and that the towers could withstand being hit by an airliner. Meerholz also believes this, as moments later a firefighter tells him a plane hit the tower and Meerholz believes that “no doubt [firefighters] would take charge of the man in the wheelchair” (167). Neither Beyea nor Zelmanowitz survive.

“And so the people inside the south tower remained unaware of the open staircase. They spoke to their families, who watched the towers burn on television, but also did not know about the stairway. The word had not gotten back to the fire commanders, to the 911 call center, or to broadcasters, so the information that stairway A was available did not circle back to the places where it might have done some good. Like the lifeboats that left the Titanic half-empty, stairway A remained little used.” 

Here, Dwyer and Flynn illustrate how lack of proper communication between rescue agencies plagued evacuation attempts despite it being known by some that stairway A was open. Had proper communication channels been in place, many more might have escaped the south tower before its collapse. 

“They took a construction elevator to the 40th floor of the south tower, and stepped into the steel skeleton. To leave a swanky nightclub for a raw, unfinished building hardly seemed like the classic gondola ride to romance. Yet from there, on the 40th floor, the world and all in it were spread before them. To the north, the sky was stenciled by the night-lit forms of office towers […] They were one hundred feet higher than the torch of the Statue of Liberty […] They had become part of the city’s candelight, in a building that was still being born.” 

This quote provides a moment of romantic narrative relief from the tension and horror of the morning of 9/11. It describes the end of a first date between firefighter Tom Kelly and his future wife, Kitty, recalling a night thirty years earlier, in September 1971, when Kelly, then working as an apprentice steamfitter in construction, sneaks his date up into the unfinished trade center where he worked. 

“More than a gigantic tower had fallen. The construction of the trade center had absorbed the labor of men, women, and machines. As the shape of a mighty work came undone, the efforts of thousands of people dissolved.” 

Like the previous quote, here the sense of an end of an era rings through. Dwyer and Flynn express how the collapsing of the towers, and the attacks, signified much more than a single attack. It is as though a century of technological advances, American economic prowess, and the hub of an entire city dissolved in a single morning.

“Decades earlier, before the towers rose to altitudes nearly out of sight, each one had been bolted to bedrock seven stories below the street, a depth virtually out of sight. At their nearest point, the buildings were separated by 131 feet. For twenty-eight years, in weather fair and foul, they kept their distance, parallel lines that could not cross, no matter how high the towers rose into the sky or how deep they sank into the earth. In a span of seconds, the south tower pulverized itself and became a mammoth cloud of dust that blasted into the base of the north tower, curling up the shafts and stairways of its twin. Geometry dissolved, the two buildings had met.”

This quote illustrates how the best laid of efforts of engineers and architects could not withstand the forces of physics that led to the towers’ collapse. After years of planning and building, and decades of business, the World Trade Center dissolved into dust. 

“The 1993 bombing had shown them it could stand up. It was, he thought, the Titanic mentality.” 

Here, the authors capture the sense of overconfidence many had in regard to the idea that the towers could withstand almost any force, natural or manmade. It’s the same sort of overconfidence the Titanic’s engineers had. In both cases, this confidence proved tragically fatal. The thoughts in this quote belong to Police Lieutenant Warren Smith, who, paragraphs earlier, seems shocked that firefighters had not yet received word to evacuate, for the south tower already collapsed, and collapse of the north tower seems imminent. 

“In a world where zealots could see only icons to smash, the attacks made sense; in a world where people like Diane DeFontes sat alone in an empty law office, eating yogurt and answering phones, the idea that the attack had fallen on the representatives of a superpower seemed hallucinatory.” 

Here, Dwyer and Flynn communicate the strangeness of the idea that civilians working in the World Trade Center served as representatives of a world superpower hated by a group of terrorists. Indeed, much of 102 Minutes is dedicated to showing the everyday lives of the everyday people who worked in the towers. The workers were family people, bachelors, senior citizens, who set out to work each morning not to show America as a superpower but to lead ordinary lives. Note the authors’ understanding of the thought process of terrorists who, in order to carry out horrific acts, dehumanized victims, thinking of human beings as symbols instead of people.