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Although the spring was an intense political season in 1800, the summer months were much quieter: “Even Adams and Jefferson settled into something akin to their customary summer routines at home. With no critical elections scheduled for the summer, observers and participants had time to assess the state of play” (164). These political assessments produced a new season of the election, in which “issues of extraordinary concern to select groups of voters rose through to the fore. One issue that gained particular attention was the supposed scandal regarding Jefferson’s religion” (165). The debate was famed in terms of whether he was a Deist or an atheist—whether or not he believed in God.
Jefferson, long vocal on civil liberties in general, was a particularly strong advocate of the freedom to worship, enshrined in the mandated separation between Church and State. He “never publicly professed either Deism or atheism, even though critics regularly accused him of holding such views” (171). The basis for the attacks were his publications supporting the separation of church and state: “Notes on the State of Virginia, written by Jefferson nearly two decades earlier, provided most of the fodder for his opponents” (171). Jefferson was caught in a bind when it came to dealing with this smear campaign “Although Jefferson privately denounced the ‘lying pamphlets’ and ‘absolute falsehoods’ of his Christian critics, he feared the responding to them publicly would make matters worse” (173). However, Federalists did not solely use the smear-campaign tactic:
Just as Federalists uses selected excerpts from Notes on the State of Virginia to paint Jefferson as a Deist, Republicans drew on earlier political writings by Adams to tag him as a monarchist. The charge was old, but Republicans prosecuted it with renewed vigor as negative attacks intensified during the summer and fall. It was central to their campaign against Adams(177-78).
He was portrayed in the Republican press as excessively sympathetic to Britain and troublingly in favor of their monarchical form of government. This campaign hurt his public image, as much as the question of religion hurt Jefferson’s: “With all the candidates sullied, some parties descended to the level of debating the relative merits of pious hypocrite [Adams] versus a known infidel [Jefferson] as President” (175). According to Larson, the country perceived the stakes of the final relevant contests as extremely high: "By this time partisans on both sides has convinced themselves that the outcome of the 1800 presidential election, which now hinges on the electoral votes from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, could alter the course of American history” (188). This was the product of their partisan anxiety. Each side feared that losing this election would put the Presidency in the hands of someone entirely unfit to run the nation.
In the spring and summer of 1800, a man named Gabriel—a slave in Virginia who worked as a blacksmith—organized a slave revolt when he “conspired with other slaves in the region […] and became their general. Others served as captains and sergeants” (191). Gabriel used his smithy skills to forge weapons for the army, including bullets for their guns: “He claimed that thousands of slaves would rise on his call and hoped that free Blacks and poor whites would rally to his banner. Inverting Patrick Henry’s famous cry, Gabriel crafted a flag that read, ‘Death or Liberty’” (191). Governor James Monroe was concerned when the plot became known and informed Jefferson. The plot was foiled by inclement weather on the night that Gabriel and his fellow revolutionaries intended to attack Prosser’s Plantation, but it still became a major campaign issue.
The Virginia court had final say as to sentencing in cases of conspiracy, rebellion, and insurrection, and in this case, Gabriel received the death penalty for his role in the events at Prosser’s. The trial became a point of reference in the national political conversation: “Many articles blamed Jefferson’s egalitarian rhetoric for the slaves’ actions” (195) and so, “[f]rom a political standpoint, Virginia Republicans needed to display sufficient toughness to assure frightened citizens (particularly in key southern states) that a Jefferson administration would keep the peace” (194). The campaign messaging took a sharp turn to focus on this issue through the fall.
In a move that shocked much of the political establishment, though not the Federalist inner circle, Hamilton officially disavowed Adams in October of 1800. High Federalists had never come to terms with Adams for reaching out to France in the wake of the French Revolution, and the feud between Adams and Hamilton expressed this longstanding rift.
Hamilton didn’t simply avow his support of Pinckney, he also publicly attacked Adams in the press: “Published on October 22, Hamilton’s ‘letter’ ran fifty-four printed pages in pamphlet form and read like one long rant” (216). It questioned everything from Adams’s leadership to his patriotism, scrutinizing his record of public service all the way back to the Revolutionary War. This letter, intended to galvanize support for High Federalist candidate, Pinckney, instead backfired and merely tarnished Hamilton’s reputation, as most people saw it as out of line.
Shortly after the publication of the letter, the final electoral college voters were selected. The results of the Pennsylvania and South Carolina processes were such that the grand total of representatives heading to submit votes through the electoral college were seventy-three Republican electoral college voters and sixty-five Federalist voters. Each voter was allowed two votes to allocate amongst the four candidates: Adams, Jefferson, Pinckney, and Burr. If two candidates earned the same number of votes, the sitting Congress would choose between them, for President and Vice President. This suggested that Jefferson and Burr, as the Republican candidates, would likely be the final two front runners for the presidency, leaving Adams and Jefferson in third and fourth place, respectively.
The election did, in fact, come to that stunning end: Burr and Jefferson came out ahead of Adams and Pinckney in the electoral college votes. Unfortunately for the Republicans, they ended up ahead in equal measure, with each earning exactly 73 votes in the electoral college.
Due to a hitch in the design of the electoral college voting process, the election of 1800 resulted in a situation where Republicans had enough electoral college votes to put their candidates, Jefferson and Burr, into the first two spots, while Adams and Pinckney did end up taking third and fourth. However, the Republicans could not celebrate, as they had to sit back and allow their Federalist rivals to rank their candidates into the positions of the Presidency and Vice Presidency. This was the method that the founders chose to resolve a tie in electoral college voting.
Congress then met in Washington. Theoretically, there were not supposed to be debates about the vote, but no one, Federalist and Republican alike, could resist the temptation to debate the question of whether Burr or Jefferson should be President. Hamilton, enraged that his longtime rival, Aaron Burr, could be so close to the Presidency, ended up campaigning hard for Jefferson, a great irony after having spent so much of the campaign not only opposing Jefferson, but also Adams, for simply being too similar to Jefferson.
Congress met to cast the tie-breaking votes: representatives either cast their vote for Jefferson, for Burr, or they abstained. The first tie-breaking vote resulted in another tie, so Congress had to vote again, only to produce another tie. All told, Congress cast six tie-breaking votes before Thomas Jefferson finally emerged over Aaron Burr as the winner. Jefferson became the President, and Aaron Burr became the Vice President, all thanks to the votes of a Federalist-dominated Congress.
While Chapters 1 through 6 provided the context for the Election of 1800, describing the American political landscape and showing the ways in which old political rivalries animated the build-up to the election, Chapters 7 through 10 delve into both the most pressing issues raised on the campaign trail as well as into the dramatic conclusion of the long affair.
The two most significant issues raised and debated on the campaign trail were the question of the candidates’ relationship to the church and their stances on a slave uprising that took place in Virginia. These issues were debated within the broader context of the American reaction to the French Revolution, as discussed by Larson in Chapters 1 through 6.
The Federalists positioned themselves as the antidote to any American insurrection. They analogized the slave revolt at Prosser’s Plantation to the Jacobin violence in France. They consistently evoked the question of law and order as a way to motivate voters to cast ballots in favor of Federalist candidates. The Republicans, on the other hand, seized on the law and order language and framed it as an expression of Federalist tendencies to overstep the proper bounds of their power. They worked, especially through their vocal presses in Philadelphia, to portray Adams as an avowed monarchist. They exaggerated his fondness for the British form of government in order to sway voters away from selecting another Federalist President.
The Federalists likewise exaggerated characteristics of Jefferson’s; they seized upon his convictions about the freedom to worship enshrined in the Bill of Rights and used this conviction as the basis for depicting him (in their own presses) as a godless man, unfit for the Presidency. In this way, the broader movements of politics at the time influenced the specifics of campaign trail speech and the wording of the opinion pieces in local newspapers. This unification of political messaging, across regions and messengers, was a new feature of campaign life, which continues to define the experience of contemporary campaigners.
Ultimately, all the calumny tipped the scales in the favor of the Republicans, but not in an uncomplicated way. The Republicans earned the most electoral college votes, but then their electoral college voters distributed their votes to the two republican candidates (Jefferson and Burr) perfectly equally, sending the tie-breaking vote to the Federalist Congress.
This would not have happened had the Republicans voted in a slightly less partisan way. If even one Republican electoral college voter spent one of his two votes on either Adams or Pinckney, then the Republicans would have retained complete control over the ranking of Jefferson/Burr. The extreme partisan climate, however, resulted in their loss of control over that decision, illustrating the ways in which hardline partisan politicking tangles even a unified party effort to achieve an intraparty goal.
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