Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community

Putnam dismisses the explanatory factor of pervasive busyness, as there is no evidence that Americans have less leisure time in the 1990s than they did several decades ago. Furthermore, working Americans are more likely to participate in civic life than non-workers, and civic decline is similar among the most and least busy. Financial anxiety is known to inhibit social engagement, however, the decline in civic participation not only continued in the booms of the 1980s and 1990s but was as great among the affluent as the financially stressed. At most, Putnam concludes, financial anxiety accounts for 5-10% of the total decline in civic engagement.

The movement of women into the paid labor force is a “double-edged sword” (196) for civic engagement, increasing the opportunities for new connections but decreasing the time for engagement. Working women, particularly single parents, have increased their civic involvement in formal organizations, however, women working full-time out of economic necessity have less formal and informal social involvement. Women traditionally were more inclined than men to have informal connections, and those have decreased. Part-time workers have the greatest level of involvement, prompting Putnam to note that civic engagement could increase if more men and women had the option of part-time work. He does not blame the entry of women into the paid labor force for the decline in civic engagement, claiming that it and financial anxiety account for less than 10% of the overall decline. Additionally, he notes that “civic engagement and social connectedness have diminished almost equally for both women and men, working or not, married or single, financially stressed or financially comfortable” (203).

Since residential mobility has not increased in the last 50 years, that factor alone cannot account for the decline in civic engagement. More Americans are moving to major metropolitan areas where social capital and civic engagement tend to be weaker. However, the number of Americans flocking to cities in the first two-thirds of the 20th century grew as well with no effect on civic involvement. Additionally, civic engagement has decreased by similar rates in cities, suburbs, and small towns.

Suburbs have become more homogeneous, including “lifestyle enclaves” (209), a development that tends to reduce civic engagement. Suburban sprawl has increased the amount of time that Americans spend driving in their cars alone. For example, by 1990, 80-90% of Americans commuted to work alone in their cars versus 64% in 1980 (213). People drive for personal reasons as well, such as shopping. Every 10 minutes spent commuting reduces community involvement by 10%. Suburbs additionally disrupt the boundaries of a community, with people traveling to other cities for work or shopping. Zoning prevents gathering places in residential areas. Putnam concludes that the effects of suburban sprawl account for approximately 10% of the total decline in civic engagement while residents of large metropolitan areas see about a 20% drop in civic involvement.

The merger of telecommunications and entertainment, especially via television, has privatized the consumption of entertainment and impacted all features of American life. Those who read the news are more engaged in public life and more knowledgeable than those who watch the news on television. Tellingly, newspaper readership has fallen 57% from 1948 to 1998. News viewership on television is also declining as there is less interest in the news per se, and electronic media is dedicated primarily to entertainment. The prevalence of television has arguably had the greatest impact. In 1950, only 10% of American homes had television sets, but by 1959, 90% did. In 1995, television viewing comprised 40% of the average American’s time. With multiple television sets in households, there was more private viewing, and television began to segment markets with multiple channels and targeted advertising.

Selective viewers of television, or those who tune in for a particular show, are more likely to be civically engaged than habitual viewers, and by the 1990s, habitual viewers outnumbered selective ones. The more one watches television, the less likely that individual will partake in every form of civic participation and social involvement: Putnam estimates that for every hour watched, there is a 10% reduction in community involvement. Television keeps people in their homes and is therefore bad for both individual and collective engagement as well as for activities done together. Indeed, watching television is the single most consistent predictor of civic disengagement (231). Those who watch a lot of television are also more likely to be uncivil in their behavior toward others. Putnam comments that television leaves some at an “arrested stage of development” (244), referred to as parallel play, in which two children play in a sandbox with a toy but not one another. The onset of habitual television watching “coincided exactly with the national decline in social connectedness and the trends were most marked among the younger generations” (246).

The strong correlation does not prove causation. However, the timing, effects on youth, and one study suggest some causation: The greater degree of youthful exposure to television, the greater chance those youths will be disengaged. Heavy viewership by the young is associated with civic ignorance, cynicism, less political involvement later in life, and poorer educational achievements.

Television potentially reduces civic engagement in three ways. Unlike other activities, watching television inhibits participation. Typically, those who participate in one area do so in others as well. In contrast, television competes for small amounts of time. Secondly, television operates on the psyche, with heavy viewing associated with lethargy, passivity, loneliness, emotional difficulties, and malaise. Finally, the content of television contributes to disengagement. Those who watch news are more active, while those who watch soap operas, game shows, and other entertainment programming are less engaged. These entertaining programs occupy the lion’s share of the content. Putnam concludes that the evidence is “powerful and circumstantial” (246) that television “and its electronic cousins are willing accomplices” and possibly “ringleaders” (246) in the trend of civic disengagement.

While almost every group in American society has reduced its civic involvement, middle-aged and older people constitute the one exception. This introduces the theme of Generational Succession as a Primary Explanation for the Decline in Social Capital. Putnam distinguishes life cycle changes, in which individuals change but society does not, from generational effects or succession, which change society and do not impact individuals. Generational succession accounts for changes in church attendance, voting, political interest, associational memberships, and social trust while declines in informal engagement or schmoozing are societal changes. He speculates that electronic entertainment, such as television, has driven the latter change. Generational succession, however, is responsible for approximately half of the overall decline in civic engagement. The same pattern of faster rates of decline for younger cohorts repeats itself in newspaper readership, and “practically every form of civic engagement” (251).

The long civic generation, born between 1910 and 1940, played a leading civic role despite receiving less formal education than subsequent generations. Putnam argues that the shared experience of World War II shaped this generation. During that war, there was a sense of solidarity and shared adversity. Millions contributed to the war effort via military service, financial contributions of goods, and voluntary organizations. This was the last generation to grow up without television as well.

Born between 1946 and 1964, Baby Boomers were more educated and affluent than their parents. The first generation to grow up with television, Boomers are more individualistic and have less respect for authority than the previous generation. As a result, they are more distrustful of institutions, alienated from politics and less involved in civic life. Generation X, born between 1965 and 1980, are also less likely to trust other people than the long civic generation, less involved civically, less informed, and more individualistic. Citing the high rates of depression and suicide among younger people, Putnam considers social isolation a plausible explanation. In the 1940s and 1950s, younger people were happier than older one and less likely to commit suicide. Those numbers are reversed in the 1990s. One countertrend is the increase in volunteering and community service among Generation X.

Putnam maintains that the gradual replacement of the long civic generation with Baby Boomers and Generation X accounts for about half of the decline in civic engagement. “[G]enerational math [...] is the single most important explanation for the collapse of civic engagement over the last several decades” (255). Its visible effects were delayed because it takes time for a new generation to become numerically dominant in the adult population (255), and the massive expansion of college enrollments after World War II served to offset the declines in civic participation.

Reviewing the evidence, Putnam rejects the notion that changes in the American family structure, race and white flight from cities, governmental spending, and capitalist forces cause civic disengagement. Aside from youth- and church-related engagement, marital and parental status do not impact membership in groups. If racism were driving disengagement, it is hardly likely that the oldest generation would buck the trend. Governmental spending on domestic programs has not changed significantly in the last 25 years. The US has had a capitalist system for centuries. He does admit that economic changes could be driving some of the decrease in philanthropic and civic activities, but not others.

Generational succession accounts for about half of the decline in civic engagement, with 10-15% of that amount an overlap with the long-term effects of television. Television and electronic entertainment are responsible for 25% of the decline, with pressures of time and money and suburban sprawl each accounting for 10%. At least 5% of the explanation is unknown.