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The day after Hamilton’s speech, Madison rose and “tore the New Jersey plan to pieces” (116), pointing out how it did little to mitigate the problems affecting the Articles. A vote then found a strong preference for the Virginia Plan. The next day, the Convention removed the term “national” from the Virginia Plan and replaced it with “government of the United States” so that it acknowledged explicitly the importance of the states (118). As debate ensued, Luther Martin finally spoke, giving a long speech defending the sovereignty of the states and insisting that a federal government not interfere with their prerogatives. Stalling on major issues, the Convention turned to smaller issues like pay for representatives, but there also found little common ground. At last it succeeded in securing two-year terms for the lower legislative house, and six years for the higher (as it would be in the final text). The delegates also agreed that both houses could originate legislation, and that representatives could also hold state offices. Still, the question of representation loomed, with Martin denouncing the very idea of a bicameral legislature. He even suggested that “he would rather see partial confederations than submit to the Virginia Plan” (124). Franklin regretted the lack of consensus, and called for daily morning prayers to reaffirm their need of God’s help. To their embarrassment, the Convention realized they had no money to pay a clergyman.
The Convention was in a deadlock over the question of representation. Sherman put forth his compromise one more time, but for now it was not enough to convince the small-state defenders that they would have sufficient protection. Gunning Bedford of Delaware claimed that the Convention itself served as proof that the large states “sought to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small ones” (130). He then threatened that small states would “find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith who will take them by the hand and do them justice” (131), provoking immediately backlash from other delegates. Even so, his rash words did remind the Convention that foreign influence was a real danger, especially in the absence of a strong central government. With the French Revolution still a few years away, the French king who had allied with the Americans during the Revolution “preferred to see us weak and divided” (133). At the time, Europe was in a constant state of war and its great powers were always watching the state of America, especially concerned that its example of representative government might spread to their autocratic shores. They also looked with contempt upon the Americans for their inability to repay their loans. In Europe, monarchical power seemed more assured than ever. Both Jefferson and Adams, who lived in France and England, respectively, complained bitterly about the low reputation their country held abroad. Independence Day in 1787 was a holiday for the Convention, and the celebration prompted several cities to express hopes that the Philadelphia Convention would succeed. Yet when the Convention reconvened, several days went by with no agreements at all, and a visitor to George Washington was reminded “of [his face’s] expression during the terrible months we were in Valley Forge Camp” (140). Washington himself wrote to Hamilton that he was profoundly concerned about the Convention.
At this point, Bowen shifts the scene from the Convention to the country as a whole in 1787, beginning with the site of the Convention, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia had been home to many French visitors, who wrote (mostly) favorable accounts to their friends and family back home. Pennsylvania struck them as the middle ground between the South with its chattel slavery and the North with its Puritanical morals. They romanticized Indigenous Americans as “noble savage[s]” living in communion with nature and free from the corruption of modern society. Europeans consumed travel narratives about America, many of them filled with pseudo-scientific theories on its climate, vegetation, and habits. Many of these narratives were critical, treating Americans with a mix of confusion and disdain, but “it was clear also that certain circles looked to [Americans] with hope and good faith, equating their own revolutionary plans with the success of [Americans’] experiment” (145). Visitors were shocked at the sheer size of the country, particularly its seemingly endless forests. Expecting a mild climate and amenable farmland, visitors often experienced punishing heat and unforgiving soil. They learned to eat squirrels and oysters. The French in particular were surprised at the lack of adornment in the churches, and the relative lack of abject poverty, although “travelers agreed that the further south one went, the more this condition deteriorated” (151). They admired the pioneers who were constantly on the move, seeing it as a willingness to abandon the past in pursuit of a better future.
European visitors were fascinated by the differences between themselves and the Americans, whose white inhabitants were of course European in origin. Class seemed to exert much less influence on social relations, and a spirit of egalitarianism prevailed, so that the governor of Massachusetts greeted visitors to his home, rather than any servant. State officials were rare, as were people of great wealth. The English were impressed with farmers owning their own land rather than paying rents to a lord. Visitors almost always found slavery repellant, but were impressed with the lack of beggars. They were also impressed by an apparently universal ability to read and write, and the many practical skills that the Americans seemed to acquire at a young age. They also noticed many small differences in language. Noah Webster’s dictionary was not just a catalog of words, but a way to formalize a distinctly American mode of speech rooted in “equality of birth and fortune” (160). Europeans marveled at the spread of higher education and the various societies promoting forms of practical, scientific knowledge. While medical treatments remained ineffective or horrific, and hygiene was exceptionally bad in cities, “America in 1787 was on the verge, the very brink of industrial and scientific expansion” (164). French visitors found “the prudery of young American matrons” to be “unconscionable” (166), with too much insistence on separating the sexes in any social gathering. They found this rigidness to be characteristic of a young society that had not yet arranged itself into a proper hierarchy, but at the same time, they drew a connection between the simplicity of Americans’ manners and their willingness to fight for freedom.
Bowen now focuses on the Western Territories, which ranged from Lake Superior to Mississippi and Alabama. The coordinated settlement of these territories was part of the reason for devising a more central form of government, but in the meantime many states were pressing their own claims on the territories, risking conflict with each other and with foreign powers like Spain, which still controlled access to the Mississippi River. The Convention had agreed to give Congress power to admit new states to the union, but it was undecided whether those states would have the same rights as the original 13. Settlers were pouring into those territories, demanding quick action. Washington himself had begun his career as a land speculator in western Virginia, and would later own thousands of acres of frontier land. Bowen denies that delegates “allowed speculative interests to influence their action in the Federal Convention” (172), but notes the July arrival to the Convention of Manessah Cutler, a co-founder of the Ohio Company who had just negotiated a massive land purchase with Congress in New York (the capital at the time). He arrived to “see that the United States Constitution […] included no measures obstructive to westward expansion—and to the Ohio Company” (174). Congress had just passed the Northwest Ordinance, allowing territories to enter the union on an equal footing once they reached a certain degree of settlement and political organization, but the Convention could potentially nullify that provision. Some of the maritime states opposed equality for states that might soon exceed them in population as settlers moved from east to west. Morris insisted on basing representation off of property rather than population. This proved to be a minority position, linking those who were opposed on many other issues. Madison led the charge, arguing that states would never join at all if they had to do so on an inferior basis. Cutler then met with several of the delegates, and while there is no existing record of their conversation, “[t]he Reverend Manessah could tell his colleagues in New England that things looked promising for the Ohio Company” (183). Debate over the West would continue, with Morris fighting a rearguard against equality, but eventually the Constitution gave Congress the power to admit new states on an equal basis, and to govern the territories in the interim.
In the month between Hamilton’s speech and the adoption of the Great Compromise (discussed in Chapter 15), Bowen finds little worthy of discussion in the actual Convention. Having solved the basic question of whether they were in fact creating a new government, and not merely revising the Articles, they now had the unpleasant task of negotiating details on representation, modes of election, and the status of slavery. They, therefore, prioritized less important matters where consensus was easier to achieve, in the hope of building up sufficient goodwill for the hard discussions to follow. Bowen then takes the opportunity to pause the narrative and shift her focus to the country at large, chiefly America’s Relationship to the Outside World. These chapters do not so much describe the actual land and people of America as how they were perceived through European eyes. The nation fascinated observers with its “almost limitless resources for wealth and material expansion” (145), feeding into myths of limitless opportunity that would inspire successive waves of immigrants. The sheer power of that myth seemed to prompt other writers to try and puncture it, lending their (questionable) scientific authority to argue “that the American continent, being only recently formed, had scarcely finished drying out; in places the land was still a deep swamp. Therefore the meager vegetation, the scentless plants, feeble animals and short-bodied men, hairless and discouragingly impotent in the marriage bed” (144). In the 11th Federalist Papers, Hamilton scornfully notes some of this foreign commentary, citing a French researcher who found that the air was so poor in America that dogs eventually lost the ability to bark. Seeking to rile his audience, Hamilton then tells them “facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation” (Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 11: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy.” The Independent Journal, 1787). Hamilton’s design for a commercial republic was as much a threat to some as it was a promise to others. Before long, France would kick off Europe’s own reckoning with republicanism and revolution. For those who feared such a prospect, it was imperative to downplay the significance of the American experiment, even to prove it contrary to the laws of nature.
Where most Europeans would probably never be able to confirm or deny speculations about its geography, it was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the striking example of its people. Much of the commentary summarized in these chapters anticipates the most famous American travelogue by a European, Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, published in two volumes in 1835 and 1840. Tocqueville found America to be an astonishing display of equality, and Bowen likewise describes European visitors upset “to find no distinction in dress between maid and mistress, or between the lower orders and the first magistrate of the state” (158). While they saw less economic divide than at home, they were nonetheless shocked to encounter the astonishing brutality of chattel slavery. Also anticipating Tocqueville (himself a member of the aristocracy), Europeans tended to view Americans as crude and unsophisticated, albeit thoroughly practical and capable of enormous production and innovation. But while the collective power of the Americans was remarkable, they were also a people prone to isolation, especially across the vast distances of the western frontier.
Ultimately, these chapters are not a distraction from the narrative but a reminder of the Convention’s significance. The fate of the United States hung in the balance, just as likely to be an ignominious and chaotic failure as a great and influential success. The world had a vested interest in one outcome or the other, and recognition of their task as one of worldwide importance would help the Convention achieve compromise at the very moment when it seemed most impossible.
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