On Liberty

The second chapter is the first of three chapters that discuss a particular “branch” of the thesis Mill presents in the first chapter about a person’s right to rule themselves. This chapter focuses on limiting expressions of opinions. In Mill’s view, there should be absolutely no stifling or policing a person’s opinion, and that the diversity of opinions aid mankind whether those opinions are true, partly true, or entirely false. When an opinion is true, society should embrace it, even if it is not a popular opinion. Mill writes, “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility” (15). Although people tend to assume that they are correct and others are wrong, anyone can hold a false opinion and benefit from the truth they can learn from another thinker. Even if opinions are only partly true or false, they might still aid a discussion that can result in uncovering truth.

The issue of human fallibility—the capacity for any person to be wrong or imperfect—occupies a great deal of Mill’s commentary. Since people can be wrong but will not readily accept their wrongness, no one should have the authority to silence an opinion that differs from their own. Mill anticipates arguments against his assertion and addresses them in turn. For example, he recognizes that many people would argue that people should act on their convictions to show moral fortitude and confidence, even if they might be wrong. Mill insists that people can work towards truth by regularly engaging in debate, which requires differing opinions. Someone might reasonably act on a conviction only if that conviction has been thoroughly examined and tested: “There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation” (16). The former is the product of allowing the full expression of opinions. The latter stems from the troubling tendency to view oneself as infallible.

Mill also discusses government and the public good. He realizes that people may prefer that governments uphold certain creeds and ideas. Again, Mill insists that societal wellbeing stems from debate and critical engagement with ideas and opinions. He notes that Jesus was crucified for radical ideas, but those ideas proved to be beneficial, in Mill’s view, after his lifetime (21). People may no longer be put to death so easily, Mill acknowledges, but the suppression of their opinions is still a great disservice to both them and society as a whole.

Mill transitions in this section from discussing a person’s right to have and express opinions into a discussion of a person’s right to act on those opinions and influence the people and world around them. In many regards, he upholds the view that people should generally be free from active policing from a government or from a community. He notes again that where a person’s action might harm another individual, it becomes fair and necessary for society or the legal system to intervene. He argues that actions do not warrant quite the same amount of freedom from intervention that opinions do, but he maintains that the expression of individuality improves society.

A critical piece of Mill’s argument is that the possibility of self-harm does not legitimize social or legal prevention or punishment. He writes,

If [a person] refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost (46).

While Mill acknowledges the potential for self-harm in his prescription, he emphasizes how important individuality is for both personal and communal growth.

Social conventions are important to some extent. He notes that “it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it” (48). In youth, a person hopefully learns how to function in civilized society and benefit from the wisdom of generations before them. Once that foundation is established, however, “it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being […] to use and interpret experience in his own way” (48). He champions impulses and any “intelligent deviation from custom” that breaks conformity without harming people (49). He says that individuality breeds character (50).

Mill then discusses how a person’s individuality benefits others. He notes that while “persons of genius” are rare, “it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow” (54). If a society is not accepting of individuality and originality, it will not be accepting of genius, even though everyone admires genius in theory. There needs to be an “atmosphere of freedom” in order for genius to truly blossom (54). Even besides the few geniuses who might emerge when given the opportunity, people in general require different paths and patterns. “Different persons,” he writes, “require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical atmosphere and climate” (56). Society needs to make it acceptable for people to follow different paths so that every individual might have a path towards their own success.