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State governments exploit their administrative powers to limit representation, remove polling places in non-White neighborhoods, restrict registration drives, and encourage cynicism. In fact, the Electoral Integrity Project found that North Carolina had democratic issues comparable to Iraq and Venezuela.
Redrawing congressional district maps for political gain dates back to the country’s inception with Patrick Henry exploiting the decennial process to keep James Madison out of Congress. In 1810, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry drew a district in the shape of a salamander, inspiring the term “gerrymandering,” and the South used this process to cull unfaithful politicians from its ranks.
They also practiced racial gerrymandering to limit the number of Black representatives. Tennessee’s city districts had only one third of the state’s representatives even as they outgrew rural areas in population. In Baker v. Carr, a resident challenged the law allowing this, stating that there is no way to resolve it through voting. The Supreme Court overturned the law as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause, stressing the importance of, “one person, one vote” (101).
The Court struggled, however, to control partisan gerrymandering by both political parties. In Davis v. Bandemer (1986), the court stated that it was not legally measurable. After 1990, Texas Democrats redistricted the state to take Republicans out of power to the point that Republicans won 50.8% of the congressional vote but only 13 of 30 seats. In 2002, Texas Republicans used state and federal authorities to force a special session to redraw districts to their advantage. Prior to state reforms, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger complained that Soviet countries changed representatives more often than the Golden State. North Carolina’s districts turned from a 7-6 party split in representatives to a 10-3 GOP advantage after 2010.
After the 2000 Census, the Pennsylvania legislature used computer mapping technology to optimize redistricting, increasing its control from 11 seats out of 21, to 13 out of 19. In 2004’s Vieth v. Jubelirer, the ACLU argued that this tool threatened democracy by making legislators impervious to voters. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court claimed that it was a political issue and that it couldn’t legislate fairness, which allowed the GOP to accelerate these practices in combination with the Citizen’s United and Shelby decisions.
In 2016, Democrat candidates for the House of Representatives received 1.4 million votes, but Republicans won 33 more seats, and the inflated number of GOP districts gave them as many as 22 representatives. The incumbent retention rate was also 97%, which is why legislators could pass unpopular laws like the 2017 tax bill and threaten immigration and healthcare programs.
After winning control of Wisconsin’s legislature in 2010, a secret GOP group spent four months developing district maps to secure their majority. In 2012, Democrats only won 39% of seats yet received more than half the statewide vote. Their position shrank in later elections, with some winners obtaining over 90% of the vote. Upon learning of the gerrymandering scheme, retired law professor Bill Whitford sued the state in Gill v. Whitford. While the Supreme Court previously ruled that voters cannot expect proportional representation, Whitford’s team argued that years of election results demonstrate measurable evidence and offered mathematical formulas to identify egregious cases. This includes an “efficiency gap” where a party has a systematic advantage: A rate above 7% suggests that too many votes are meaningless (111).
The district court ruled that the maps violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but the state appealed to the Supreme Court. Justices John Roberts and Neil Gorsuch dismissed Whitford’s formulas as “gobbledygook” (113). Whitford’s team countered that the congressional maps underwent revisions to optimize GOP control. Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that this case goes to the heart of whether there is an incentive to vote; Stephen Breyer suggested a simplified version of Whitford’s guidelines; and Sonia Sotomayor asked why the GOP’s multiple revisions weren’t proof enough of unconstitutional gerrymandering. In response, the state admitted that there was no constitutional requirement stopping them.
State officials have other means to impede voting. Cities frequently suffer hours-long wait times due to limited voting places. Republican-controlled swing states slash early voting periods that allow workers to cast their vote without taking time off, and Ohio only opens one early voting location in each county regardless of population. Black voter turnout declines by 0.5% for every one-tenth of a mile away from a polling place.
GOP officials also target voter registration drives. Florida and Texas require long training courses, oaths under felony penalty, and unreasonable turnaround times to submit registration cards. Texas now has a higher number of unregistered voters than the population of 20 states, and the League of Women Voters are not able to operate in it.
Anderson introduces the chapter with several one-word descriptions from various articles on gerrymandering along with a taunt from Karl Rove, a senior advisor to George W. Bush and frequent conservative media guest. She later quotes his cynical approach to electoral politics: “Control redistricting…and you control Congress” (115).
There are two types of gerrymandering. Racial gerrymandering targets Black and Latino voters so that they only receive a handful of powerless representatives. This form of redistricting takes advantage of the real estate practice of redlining, which both Northern and Southern states use to segregate people of color into undesirable neighborhoods.
The other form is partisan gerrymandering, which facilitates Republican control over all three branches of government. Gerrymandered districts are harder for the opposing party to flip and retain. When these politicians control Congress, they can push through unpopular legislation and stymie an opposing president. When one party controls both the executive and legislative wings, it can nominate ideologically extreme Supreme Court justices to lifetime appointments. For example, Anderson briefly mentions that McConnell successfully stalled the Supreme Court nomination process from 2016 until after Trump’s inauguration and changed nomination approvals to a simple majority to appoint conservative Neil Gorsuch to the late Antonin Scalia’s seat. However, on the same day as Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death in 2020, McConnell announced that he would bring a nominee to a vote with an excuse for why it didn’t violate his previous rationale (Shabad, Rebecca & Julie Tsirkin. “McConnell: I Will Fill Ginsburg’s Seat with Trump’s Nominee. Schumer Says Don’t Dare.” NBC News, 19 September 2020).
The exploitation of gerrymandering technology makes some districts nearly impossible to flip, and Anderson provides nicknames for egregious examples like “the Texas Glock” and the Georgia “Squirrel Not Yet Hit by a Car” (105). Only 4.9% of Americans live in a district where there is a less than 5% difference between winner and loser. Anderson points out that, even though partisan gerrymandering does not have the legal safeguards of racial gerrymandering, they are effectively the same, as the Republican Party is 82% White in comparison to the Democrat’s 56%. In the case of Texas, the maps favor the GOP even though Democrat-leaning Black and Latino voters are responsible for the state’s population growth.
Gerrymandering is an issue that both political parties are complicit in, and they defend redistricting with the same excuse: This is purely a political issue that the courts have limited control over. For Republicans, they claim that the maps only appear to be partisan because Democrats mostly live in cities. While rural and urban districts should both have representation, city populations are growing at a faster rate due to employment and real estate trends.
Anderson focuses on Gill v. Whitford as a case where the plaintiff offers metrics for gerrymandering. In addition to the efficiency gap, the team suggested factors such as the durable partisan effect, where a party’s representation grows despite minimal gains in voters, the GOP’s clear intent to control all branches of Wisconsin government, and the presence of districts that don’t meet previous constitutional standards.
The decision on Gill v. Whitford came after the book’s completion. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court sent the decision back to lower court. While the plaintiff could not prove statewide discrimination, it might prove it in some districts. The four liberal justices agreed with the majority decision, but their concurring opinion criticized partisan gerrymandering and suggested that statewide discrimination could be proven in the future. This correlates with Anderson’s belief that liberal justices take this issue more seriously, even though the final decision is not immediately consequential (Prokop, Andrew. “The Supreme Court Still Won’t Crack Down on Partisan Gerrymandering—Yet, at Least.” Vox, 18 June 2018).
To Anderson, gerrymandering has consequences for all political parties. Legislators now have the power to choose their voters in ways that discourage people from coming to the polls in the first place. Because there are no viable challengers in the general election, primary opponents must take more extreme positions to usurp incumbents. The fact that compromise can be as much a liability as inaction is why the US Congress fails to act in crisis situations.
Limited polling places and limited early voting harm people of color the most. In 2012, Black people waited on average twice as long in lines as White people with fewer poll workers and machines. Meanwhile, Latinos are the least likely to vote on Election Day, making early voting invaluable to them.
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