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Applebaum does not give an explicit definition of democracy. However, she does suggest that a successful, modern democracy is not simply a representative government. Democracies should have a “competitive model” and a “neutral state.” This competitive model would be economic and political, with businesses and political parties alike given the space to compete. Meanwhile, the institutions of a state, such as its courts and the media, should not be dominated by a single political party or agenda. At one point, Applebaum discusses how authoritarian governments rig both political parties and businesses. She thus implies that, for democracies, she sees the free market and democracy as strongly linked (27). Further, Applebaum at least implies that a healthy democracy is associated with “religious tolerance, independent judiciaries, free press and speech, economic integration, international institutions” (19).
When it comes to authoritarian governments, Applebaum is much more specific about its traits. Some key characteristics of authoritarian governments and their supporters in the current era she discusses include:
Through this lens, Applebaum examines what she perceives is a historic tendency of societies to turn against democracy—a recurring historical process that has happened before and will likely happen again.
Although Applebaum writes that there is “no theory that will explain everything” (188), she does offer a possible explanation as to why the current threat to democracy exists: The internet revolution that began in the 1990s has brought about “the contentious, cantankerous nature of modern discourse itself” (109).
She compares this to past information revolutions like the invention of the European printing press in the 15th century, saying it is “exactly the sort of communication revolution that has had profound political consequences in the past” (111). Democratic governments have had time to adapt to older forms of communication technology that were once new, like radio and television. As Applebaum writes, “Democratic governments struggled, at first, to find ways to counter the language of demagogues that now reached people inside their homes” (111-12).
As for newer forms of digital media, whose emergence has been “a rapid shift” (111), there has not been time for institutions, governments, and business models to adjust. Older forms of media are subjected to ethical codes, regulations, and laws that do not quite exist yet for new media (112-13). This theory is important to understand Appelbaum’s cautious optimism. If the rise of authoritarianism is primarily a result of technological change and is something mirrored in the past, then it is likely that, as circumstances change further, the threat will diminish. It is always possible that, in response to the coronavirus epidemic, “we will renew and modernize our institutions” and “we can rethink what democracy should look like in a digital age” (186, 188). Of course, Applebaum admits it is also possible that authoritarianism and polarization will instead increase. However, overall she seems to find comfort in the fact that history proves that “[n]o political victory is ever permanent […] no elite of any kind, whether so-called ‘populist’ or so-called ‘liberal’ or so-called ‘aristocratic’, rules forever” (186).
Applebaum views “Who are we?” as one of the core questions of Twilight of Democracy: “How is a nation defined? Who gets to define it? Who are we?” (178). Throughout the book, Applebaum is interested in the idea of nation. Further, she clearly believes in expanding identities beyond the nation to an international scale. When describing the party she hosted in 2019, she expresses optimism over her son’s teenage friends she met at the party: “Maybe the teenagers who feel both Polish and European, who don’t mind whether they are in the city or the country, are harbingers of something else, something better, something that we can’t yet imagine” (181).
Further, Applebaum sees a broad answer to the question that accepts diversity as important to democracy. Conversely, a narrow answer that limits “we” to an ethnic nationality is a trait of authoritarianism. For one example, one characteristic of President Trump that Applebaum bemoans is that he expressed a desire for “a return to the xenophobia and inward-looking isolationism of the 1920s” (157). Elsewhere, Applebaum bemoans how Brexit gave rise to a xenophobia that excluded Europeans from Britain: “The Polish plumbers and Spanish data analysts working in Britain were not fellow Europeans who shared a common culture but immigrants threatening the nation’s identity” (84).
Instead, Applebaum prefers the view she and her 1999 New Year’s Eve guests shared about Poland. They wanted “a Poland that was a member of NATO and on its way to joining the European Union (EU), a Poland that was an integrated part of modern Europe” (2). So, rather than being a side issue, the question of “Who are we?” is essential to the debate over democracy and authoritarianism. Applebaum would argue that since “it is possible to be rooted to a place and yet open to the world” (181), openness and diversity lead to a more functional democracy, rather than posing a threat to a national identity like the authoritarians believe.
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By Anne Applebaum