What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

In the context of Nagel’s essay, dualism refers to the philosophical view that the mind and the body are distinct and separate entities. Dualism influences Nagel’s argument about the difficulty of understanding another creature’s consciousness. Although Nagel does not explicitly advocate for dualism, his argument that conscious experience is subjective and unknowable by other beings suggests a divergence from strict physicalism, which views consciousness as a physical phenomenon.

The term “experience” repeatedly occurs in Nagel’s essay and refers to the subjective perception and interpretation of events or phenomena. Nagel argues that each organism has a unique experience significantly shaped by its physical and sensory attributes. Understanding the experience of another organism, such as a bat, poses a significant challenge due to the fundamental differences in sensory perception and interpretation.

Materialism is the belief that everything, including consciousness, can be explained by physical matter and its interactions. While Nagel does not overtly refute materialism, he challenges it by asserting the fundamental subjectivity of conscious experience, which he suggests cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone.

Objectivity, as discussed by Nagel, is the ability to understand or perceive something from a detached, unbiased perspective. He argues that there are limitations to an entirely objective approach to understanding consciousness, and that subjective experiences are integral to consciousness and cannot be fully grasped through objective analysis.

Phenomenology refers to the study of subjective experiences. In Nagel’s essay, phenomenology is relevant as he emphasizes the importance of subjective experiences—or the phenomenological aspects of consciousness—in understanding what it is like to be a certain creature, such as a bat.

Physicalism is the belief that something is no more extensive than its physical properties. While Nagel’s essay does not directly argue against physicalism, his emphasis on the subjective, experiential aspect of consciousness challenges the reduction of consciousness to purely physical phenomena.

According to this philosophical stance, nuanced systems can be understood by breaking them down to their simpler counterparts. When it comes to consciousness, Nagel challenges this approach (See: The Shortcomings of Reductionism).

Sonar perception, or echolocation, is a key attribute of bats that Nagel uses to emphasize the difference between human and bat experiences. Bats navigate their environment through echolocation, a sense which humans do not possess. Nagel posits that even if we could mimic echolocation, we would not truly understand what it is like to be a bat, as our consciousness and experiences are fundamentally different.