65 pages • 2 hours read
In his concluding section, Kissinger highlights key aspects of World Order. He briefly reviews the transformation of dominant world orders throughout history, including the 7th-century Islamic expansion, the French Revolution, the age of European diplomacy, Communism, and fascism, among others. Eventually, each order faces problems that must be addressed by providing a new definition of legitimacy or the transformation of the power balance.
When this happens, those who define the world order must first protect their territory and basic beliefs about one’s way of life. Second is the global order’s failure to accept the transformation of power relations in the world, such as the rise of China as “a structural challenge in the twenty-first century” (366). Kissinger reminds the reader that finding the balance between power and legitimacy is the source of statesmanship.
Immediately in the wake of World War II, the world sought cooperation instead of confrontation, and there was “a sense of world community” (361). Today, however, the Westphalian system of international relations is indeed in such a crisis. This crisis occurred for several important reasons. First, the “basic form of international life” (367), the state, is under extreme pressure. Second, the economic and political organizations in the world are at odds. Third, mechanisms like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are insufficient for providing meaningful cooperation between the great powers on key concerns. Fourth, Kissinger believes that it is necessary for the United States to remain indispensable in defining this world order and surpassing domestic politics.
Kissinger structures his Conclusion like the Introduction by highlighting the key issues found throughout World Order rather than summarizing the entire book. He underscores the importance of the Westphalian system of the balance of power because, in his view, it is neutral, and its nature is procedural. In other words, this system was independent of ruling dynasties and even significant internal political changes within each state. At the time of its inception in the 17th century, this approach was quite revolutionary.
Kissinger describes the American style of foreign policy, which combines hegemonic power with messianic moralizing, and calls it “American idealism” (362). Here, the author departs from his pragmatism and frames American foreign policy in a hagiographic manner:
America—as the modern world’s decisive articulation of the human quest for freedom, and an indispensable geopolitical force for the vindication of humane values—must retain its sense of direction (372).
He underscores American messianism in that the United States “identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve the just and lasting peace that had thus far eluded the world” (361-362). Kissinger refrains from providing a critical assessment of such self-perceptions by the world’s only superpower with hundreds of military bases around the world. He describes the American “torch of international leadership” (361) but does not question a single country wielding this much power.
Kissinger also reaffirms his Huntingtonian view of the civilizational clash when he compares China, India, Europe, and Islamic countries and their deeply-rooted fundamental ideas. For Hindus, writes Kissinger, it is the cycles of history. For Islam, it is the battle between peace (the believers) and war (the unbelievers). He does not subject the West to the same type of scrutiny that he applies to non-Western civilizations. Whereas such understanding is certainly relevant, this type of reasoning might come across as reductionist because it treats non-Western nations as the exotic Other.
Kissinger asserts that the divergent views on key issues are “not simply a multipolarity of power but a world of increasingly contradictory realities” (365). These realities comprise competing value systems that cannot be accommodated via universal norms. Herein lies the very paradox of globalization. The current world order simultaneously depends on globalization and, at the same time, is challenged by the political response, especially outside the West.
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By Henry Kissinger